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THROWING CAUTION TO THE WIND: THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, NAFTA AND
ENVRIONMENTAL PROTECTION IN CANADA
PAUL GUY†

ABSTRACT
According to the precautionary principle, the lack of full scientiﬁc certainty should not preclude measures to prevent environment degradation. This principle has been incorporated into numerous international
instruments and is approaching the status of customary international
law. Moreover, the Canadian government has embraced the principle and the Supreme Court of Canada recently conﬁrmed it as a basis of environmental policy in 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société
dʼ’arrosage) v. Hudson (Town).
This paper examines the ability of the precautionary principle to actually function as a guide for environmental policy in light of Canadaʼ’s
international trade obligations. In particular, it considers Canadaʼ’s
commitments under NAFTA. Under NAFTA a wide array of possible
government activity can be deemed a “trade barrier” and, under the
Chapter 11 investment provisions, governments who enact such barriers are subject to binding commercial arbitration. The author critically
analyzes the reasoning and implications that follow from two recent
Chapter 11 cases: Ethyl Corporation v. Canada and Metalclad Corporation v. Mexico. Overall, the author concludes that despite its embrace
by the international community, the Canadian government and the Supreme Court, Canadaʼ’s commitments under NAFTA effectively undercut
the ability of the precautionary principle to serve as a basis of environmental policy.
†
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I. INTRODUCTION
Governments around the world are currently confronted with environmental dangers that, while exceedingly difﬁcult to quantify to the degree
of certainty demanded by formal science, pose potentially catastrophic
dangers to life on Earth.1 Climate change, ozone depletion, acid rain,
water pollution, deforestation—the list goes on. Canada is not immune
to these threats. In fact, Canada is faced with truly unique challenges
because of its vegetational diversity, northern climate, abundant inheritance of natural resources and vast expanse of land, bordered on three of
its four sides by oceans. Moreover, because of the countryʼ’s economic
dependence on its natural resource base, particularly the forestry and
ﬁsheries industries, ensuring environmental health and vitality is of the
utmost importance for all Canadians.
Canadaʼ’s relative economic strength, its stable and developed political and legal systems, and its position as an inﬂuential middle power
enable Canada to play a leadership role in the global struggle to meet
these challenges. Yet despite its enviable position, Canadaʼ’s environmental record is far from inspiring. For instance, a 2001 study comparing Canadaʼ’s environmental record with those of the twenty other
nations in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) showed that Canada ranked only above the United States,
and was among the worst when ranked by per-capita measurements of
greenhouse gases and acid-rain causing sulphur-oxide emissions, water
use, energy consumption and the generation of nuclear waste.2
Canadian courts have recognized the need to mitigate these problems. According to some, the 2001 decision of the Supreme Court of
1

In 1992, a statement entitled “World Scientistsʼ’ Warning to Humanity” —which was signed by
more than sixteen hundred senior scientists from seventy-one countries, including over half of
all Nobel Prize winners—warned:
Human beings and the natural world are on a collision course. Human activities inﬂict harsh and
often irreversible damage on the environment and on critical resources. If not checked, many
of our current practices put at serious risk the future that we wish for human society and the
plant and animal kingdoms, and may so alter the living world that it will be unable to sustain
life in the manner that we know…. A great change in our stewardship of the Earth and life on it
is required, if vast human misery is to be avoided and our global home on this planet is not to
be irretrievably mutilated.
Quoted in D. Suzuki, The Sacred Balance (Vancouver: Greystone Books, 1997) at 3-4.
2
M. Mittelstaedt “Environment report ranks Canada near bottom of OECD,” The Globe and
Mail (11 April 2001).
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Canada in 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société dʼ’arrosage) v.
Hudson (Town)3 (hereinafter Spraytech) marked a pivotal turning point
in terms of environmental protection in Canada in that it afﬁrmed the
power of governments to enact legislation designed to protect public
and environmental health and, most importantly, endorsed the “precautionary principle” (i.e., that lack of full scientiﬁc certainty should not
preclude measures to prevent environmental degradation) as a basis for
these policies. Despite this optimism, however, there are several reasons
to question the positive impact that Spraytech, with its endorsement of
the precautionary principle, will have on environmental protection in
Canada. One of the most important considerations in this regard is the
pressure exerted on Canada by the process of economic globalization
and the international trade obligations Canada has incurred through its
participation in the World Trade Organization (OECD)4 and treaties such
as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).5
This paper critically examines the efﬁcacy of the precautionary principle as a basis of environmental policy in light of Canadaʼ’s international trade obligations. In particular, it considers Canadaʼ’s commitments
under NAFTAʼ’s Chapter 11 investment provisions. Under NAFTA a wide
array of possible government activity could be seen as a “trade barrier”
and, because of Chapter 11, governments who enact such barriers are
subject to binding arbitration designed to guarantee the right of private
moneylenders and investors a return on their investment. Focusing on
NAFTA and its Chapter 11 investment provisions vis-à-vis environmental
protection is presently necessary for two reasons. First, NAFTA is arguably the most important of the current institutional arrangements driving the process of economic globalization in that, with few exceptions,
it goes farther than any other agreement to protect the interests of pri-

3

114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société dʼ’arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 241
[Spraytech].
4
See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1144
(entered into force 1 January 1995).
5
North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of Canada, the Government
of Mexico and the Government of the United States, 17 December 1992, Can. T.S. 1994 No. 2,
32 I.L.M. 289 (entered into force 1 January 1994) [NAFTA]. For a detailed consideration of international trade law and Canadaʼ’s obligations see M.J. Trebilcock & R. Howse, The Regulation
of International Trade, 2d ed. (New York: Routledge, 1999); and J.G. Castel et al., The Canadian Law and Practice of International Trade, 2d ed. (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1997).
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vate investors and advance the cause of trade liberalization.6 As a result,
NAFTA currently serves as a template for ongoing negotiations aimed at
a new hemispheric trade agreement—the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Second, several cases involving Chapter 11 have recently
been decided or resolved. These cases provide an excellent basis upon
which to analyze the environmental impact of NAFTA and its effects on
public policy.
In short, the argument of this paper is that despite the Supreme
Courtʼ’s decision in Spraytech, Canadaʼ’s commitments under Chapter 11
effectively vitiate the precautionary principle as a basis of environmental policy. To support this argument, the paper is divided into four sections. The ﬁrst provides an overview of the Supreme Courtʼ’s decision
in Spraytech. The second section considers the precautionary principle
in more detail—including its history, its scope and its status at international law. In the third section, the fundamental principles and obligations that Canada agreed to by signing NAFTA are discussed. This section
provides an analysis of Chapter 11ʼ’s investor-state dispute settlement
provisions and concludes with a review of two Chapter 11 cases: Ethyl
Corporation v. Canada (hereinafter Ethyl) and Metalclad Corporation
v. Mexico (hereinafter Metalclad).7 In the ﬁnal section the efﬁcacy of
the precautionary principle is critically analyzed in light of Canadaʼ’s
6

The proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) would have gone further. However, in April 1998, the OECD decided to suspend efforts to conclude the MAI negotiations
within the OECD and to pursue agreement and institutionalization of multilateral investment
measures within the WTO.
7
Mexico v. Metalclad Corp. (2001), 89 B.C.L.R. (3d) 359 [Metalclad] and supplementary judgment Mexico v. Metalclad Corp. (2001), 95 B.C.L.R. (3d) 169 (B.C.S.C.) [Metalclad supplementary]. It should be noted that these two cases are not isolated incidents. Because of the
secrecy that surrounds the Chapter 11 process there is no way of knowing exactly how many
Chapter 11 disputes have actually taken place. However, in a recent report Murray Dobbin
indicates that, as of 2001, ﬁfteen cases had been made public. (M. Dobbin, Brieﬁng Paper,
“NAFTAʼ’s Big Brother: The Free Trade Area of the Americas and the Threat of NAFTA-style
ʻ‘Investor-Stateʼ’ Rules” (2001) at 3.) For a comprehensive review of the Chapter 11 cases that
have been made public see Public Citizen Global Trade Watch & Friends of the Earth, Brieﬁng
Paper, “NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-to-State Cases: Bankrupting Democracy” (Washington,
September 2001) [“Bankrupting Democracy”]. It should also be noted that many of the pending cases that have come to light involve potentially astronomical damage awards. The Santa
Barbara, California based company Sun Belt Water Inc., for instance, has commenced a claim
against the Canadian government for $14 billion, (“Bankrupting Democracy,” above) on the
grounds that the provincial ban on the bulk export of water enacted by the government of British
Columbia in 1993 eliminated any opportunity that the company had to capitalize on the waterexport business in the province.
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Chapter 11 obligations—considering in particular the legal ramiﬁcations of the Ethyl and Metalclad cases.

II.

THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADAʼ’S DECISION IN
SPRAYTECH

The case began in 1991 when the Town of Hudson, Québec, located just
west of Montreal, adopted By-law 270, restricting the use of pesticides
to speciﬁc locations and essential non-aesthetic situations. Spraytech
and Chemlawn are both landscaping and lawn care companies who operating mostly in the Montreal area. Each provides services to commercial and residential clients and both regularly utilize a variety of pesticides — all of which are approved by the federal Pest Control Products
Act.8 In addition, each company held the requisite licences to use the
pesticides under the provincial Pesticides Act.9
In 1992 Spraytech and Chemlawn were charged with using pesticides in violation of By-law 270. The companies brought a motion asking the Court to declare By-law 70 ultra vires the Town and/or inoperative on account of its conﬂict with federal and provincial legislation.
The motion was denied.10 On appeal, the decision was afﬁrmed by the
Québec Court of Appeal.11
At the Supreme Court of Canada the original decision was again afﬁrmed.12 The Court held that the By-law was not rendered inoperative
because of the alleged conﬂict with federal and provincial legislation.
Moreover, the Court reasoned that based upon the distinction between
“essential” and “non-essential” uses of pesticides, the Townʼ’s purpose
in enacting the By-law was to promote the health of its inhabitants.
This purpose fell squarely under the power granted the Town under the
Québec Cities and Towns Act.13 Further, the Court found that any restrictions on the appellantsʼ’ businesses were necessary incidents to the
8

R.S.C. 1985, c. P-9.
R.S.Q. c. P-9.3.
10
114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société dʼ’arrosage) v. Hudson (Town) (1993), 19 M.P.L.R.
(2d) 224.
11
114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société dʼ’arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), [1998] A.Q. no
2546.
12
Supra note 3.
13
R.S.Q. c. C-19.
9
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exercise of this power. The Court also noted that reading the Cities and
Towns Act in such a way as to permit the Town to regulate pesticide use
within its territory was consistent with principles of international law
and policy—and most notably, with the precautionary principle.

III. THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
In simplest terms, the precautionary principle embodies the notion that
when dealing with potential threats to public and environmental health,
“itʼ’s better to be safe than sorry.” As such, it recognizes the ability of
governments to take measures designed to protect the environment from
potentially serious risks in the absence of scientiﬁc certainty regarding
those risks. As P.S. Puttagunta notes, the basic premise underlying the
principle is that science cannot sufﬁciently predict all possible environmental outcomes of human activity and that society cannot afford to
wait to ﬁnd out if certain activity carries with it irreversible harm.14
The principle was ﬁrst articulated in 1968 in the new German air
pollution Act, Bundesimmissionsschutzgesetz, which came to be a
centerpiece of German environmental policy in the 1980ʼ’s as the government faced the realization that vast tracts of the countryʼ’s forests
were dying.15
The Canadian government recently noted in a discussion paper on
the topic that “two federal statues, two provincial statutes and several
proposed laws make speciﬁc reference to the precautionary principle.”16
In the words of the discussion paper, the precautionary principle “recognizes that the absence of full scientiﬁc certainty shall not be used as a
reason to postpone decisions where there is a risk of serious or irreversible harm.”17
Since its ﬁrst appearance in Germany in the late 1960ʼ’s the principle
has sparked an enormous amount of literature and debate. This conver14

P.S. Puttagunta, “The Precautionary Principle in the Regulation of Genetically Modiﬁed Organisms” (2000) 9 Health L. Rev. 27 at para. 3.
15
K. von Moltke, “The Dilemma of the Precautionary Principle in International Trade” (1999)
3 Bridges (ICTSD) 6, online: International Institute for Sustainable Development <http://www.
iisd.org/pdf/precaution.pdf>.
16
Government of Canada, A Canadian Perspective on the Precautionary Approach/Principle
– Discussion Document (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2001), at 11 [Discussion Document].
17
Ibid. at 2.
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sation is revealing important variations in terms of the exact contours of
the principle itself. For example, according to T. Oʼ’Riordan and J. Cameron, the precautionary principle has evolved to encompass a cluster of
basic ideas—including, inter alia, the propositions that:
•

Early preventive action is appropriate even in the absence of
a scientiﬁcally documented need when delay would impose
increased costs and greater risks of environmental harm;

•

It is important that human activities leave the environment
with wide margins of tolerance to permit natural adaptation to
human interference. Pushing the edge of the envelope is not a
good idea; and

•

The onus of proof to demonstrate the environmental feasibility
of the proposals should be placed upon those who propose
initiatives, innovations and activities whose environmental
impact is questionable. In other words, parties seeking to
engage in potentially harmful activity are faced with a rebuttable
presumption that the activity should be prohibited.18

Many commentators object to some of the speciﬁcs offered by Oʼ’Riordan
and Cameron.19 What is uncontroversial, however, is the fact that the
most widely recognized statement of the precautionary principle is Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration,20 which states:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach
shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities.
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of
full scientiﬁc certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.

18

T. Oʼ’Riordan & J. Cameron, Interpreting the Precautionary Principle (London: Earthscan
Publications, 1994) at 16-18.
19

For example, the Canadian Chemical Producersʼ’ Association (CCPA) objects to the
notion that the precautionary principle entails a rebuttable presumption that the activity in question should be prohibited. See “CCPA Response to ʻ‘A Canadian Perspective
on the Precautionary Approach/Principle Discussion Document – September 2001ʼ’” at
6 ff. Online: CCPA <http://www.ccpa.ca/english/position/enviro/PrecautionaryPaperResponse.doc>.
20
Annex I of the Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,
Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992, A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) (12 August 1992).
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As noted in a recent discussion document on the precautionary principle, the Canadian government supports the statement in Principle 15 of
the 1992 Rio Declaration.21 Furthermore, it notes:
[The] language, and the approach it [Principle 15] represents, is
consistent with Canadian practice in the ﬁeld of environmental
protection, and the approach is increasingly reﬂected in Canadian
environmental legislation, such as the Canadian Environmental
Protection Act. Canada also has a long-standing history of
implementing the precautionary approach in science-based programs
of health and safety, and natural resources conservation.22

Based upon Principle 15, the following three propositions could be said
to form the essential core of the precautionary principle:
(1) If the expected harm from an action or product is serious or
irreversible; and
(2) If the scientiﬁc forecasting of the expected harm is reasonably
uncertain; then
(3) Cost-effective measures to anticipate and/or prevent the harm
are justiﬁable.23

1. The Status of the Precautionary Principle at International Law
As will be discussed below, dispute settlement mechanisms contained
in Chapter 11 do not permit NAFTA Tribunals to make reference to the
domestic laws of the parties involved. As a result, any recourse to the
precautionary principle in a Chapter 11 dispute would have to be made
relying upon the principleʼ’s status at international law.
The most frequently cited authority on the sources of international
law is Article 38 of the International Court of Justice Statute which stipulates, inter alia, that “international law” is comprised of: (1) general
and particular international conventions that establish rules expressly
21

Discussion Document, supra note 16 at 2.
Discussion Document, supra note 16 at 2.
23
Even with these three core principles there is still plenty of room for disagreement regarding the exact meaning of phrases such as “serious or irreversible,” “reasonably uncertain,” and
“cost-effective.”
22
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recognized by the contesting states; (2) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (3) the general principles
of law recognized by civilized nations; and (4) as subsidiary means for
the determination of rules of international law, judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualiﬁed publicists of the various nations.
The two most important sources of international law are undoubtedly international conventions and international custom. As far as conventional law is concerned, the precautionary principle has appeared
in over twenty international laws, treaties, protocols and declarations
as of 200024—including the 1987 Protocol in Substances that Deplete
the Ozone Layer (“the Montreal Protocol”), the 1984 Conference on
the Protection of the North Sea, the 1992 Framework Convention on
Climate Change, the United Nationsʼ’ Agreement on Straddling and
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, the 1990 Bergen Ministerial Declaration
on Sustainable Development in the Economic Commission for Europe
Region, the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity, the 1990 Bangkok Declaration on Environmentally Sound and Sustainable Development in Asia and the Paciﬁc, and the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.25 Indeed, Freestone and Hey have documented
the principleʼ’s inclusion “in virtually every recently adopted treaty and
policy document related to the protection and preservation of the environment.”26
While the precautionary principle is found in many international
documents, there are three important qualiﬁcations that need to be noted
for the purposes of this paper. First, of the more than twenty documents
that invoke the precautionary principle, many “declarations” (e.g., the
Rio Declaration) do not create binding international legal obligations
per se. Second, unlike customary international law, conventional international law is only binding on those states that have signed and ratiﬁed

24

K.J. Barrett, Canadian Agricultural Biotechnology: Risk Assessment and the Precautionary Principle (Doctoral Thesis, Botany, University of British Columbia, 1999)
[unpublished] at 51. Cited in Puttagunta, supra note 14 at para. 3.
25

Ibid. at para. 5.
D. Freestone & E. Hey, “Origins and Development of the Precautionary Principle” in D. Freestone & E. Hey, eds., The Precautionary Principle and International Law (The Hague: Kluwer
Law International, 1996) at 41.
26
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the treaty in question. And, ﬁnally, in the case of NAFTA itself, the precautionary principle is nowhere mentioned in the text of the treaty.27
Customary international law, in contrast, creates much wider legal
obligations in that it is binding on each and every state.28 In order to
establish that a given rule is binding as customary international law it
must be established that (a) there is general and uniform state practice
upholding the rule; (b) this practice is accompanied by opinio juris (i.e.,
the conviction by states that their actions are required as a matter of
law).
According to most commentators, the precautionary principle is approaching the status of an international customary norm, but still falls
short due to insufﬁcient state practice.29 For example, as noted by the
Supreme Court in Spraytech, the Supreme Court of India considers the
precautionary principle to be a customary international norm.30 Yet Canadaʼ’s position is just the opposite.
The precautionary principle/approach appears in a large number of
international instruments, and Canadaʼ’s obligations in that regard
are governed by its expression in those instruments. Due to an
absence of clear evidence of uniform State practice and opinio juris,
Canada does not yet consider the precautionary principle to be a rule
of customary international law.31

Interestingly, Lʼ’Heureux-Dubé J., for the majority in Spraytech, came
very close to accepting that the principle was a customary norm. She
27

Chapter 21 of NAFTA states that the General Exceptions contained in Article XX of the
General Agreement on Tariffs And Trade [GATT] 30 October 1947, 58 U.N.T.S. 187, Can. T.S.
1947 No. 27 (entered into force 1 January 1948) apply. Article XX (b) states that nothing in
the GATT shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement of any measure necessary
to protect human, animal or plant life or health. Nonetheless, the precautionary principle is
mentioned nowhere in the GATT and the case law suggests that it does not fall under the Article
XX(b) exception.
28
States can, of course, always declare that they object to a particular customary rule. The effect
of such a declaration is a complex question that is beyond the scope of this paper. Sufﬁce to say
that, like customary international itself, the answer will depend, in large part, upon the reaction
of other states.
29
Cf., for example, O. McIntyre & T. Mosedale, “The Precautionary Principle as a Norm of
Customary International Law” (1997) 9:2 J. Enviro. L. 221.
30
A.P. Pollution Control Board v. Nayudu, 1999 S.O.L. Case No. 53, at p.8; and Vellore Citizens
Welfare Forum v. Union of India, [1996] Supp. 5 S.C.R. 241. Cited by the S.C.C. in Spraytech,
supra note 3 at para. 32.
31
Discussion Document, supra note 16 at 10.
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wrote: “As a result, there may be ʻ‘currently sufﬁcient state practice to
allow a good argument that the precautionary principle is a principle of
customary international law.ʼ’”32 In their concurring opinion, the minority simply ruled that references to international sources had “little relevance” to the questions at issue.33

IV. NAFTAʼ’S CHAPTER 11 INVESTMENT PROVISIONS
1. NAFTAʼ’s Fundamental Principles
Chapter 11 of NAFTA deals with “investment” and covers a much broader
range of economic activity than what conventionally would fall under the
rubric of “international trade.” As opposed to “trade,” “investment” has
no necessary connection to the export or import of any good or service.
Under NAFTA, “investment” is a very broad category that includes things
such as incorporated and non-incorporated businesses, shareholdings,
loans made to foreign companies for more than three years, real estate,
intellectual property and goodwill.34 Furthermore, investment refers not
only to present property interests, but also includes those that are merely
expected so that both present and projected proﬁts are included.35
In short, NAFTAʼ’s investment provisions establish a set of legally enforceable rules that make it safer and easier for foreign investors to ensure return on their investments. In doing so, Chapter 11 takes several
of the key principles of trade liberalization that are typically applied to
32

Spraytech, supra note 3 at para. 32 [emphasis added]. One of the reasons behind the majorityʼ’s
reluctance to endorse the precautionary principle as a binding rule at customary international
law was no doubt the fact that under Canadian constitutional law an adoptionist approach is
taken vis-à-vis customary international law whereby it is presumptively part of the common law
unless there is an explicit legislative intention to the contrary. Reference Re Powers Of Ottawa
(City) and Rockfcliffe Park, [1943] S.C.R. 208 (sub nom. Foreign Legations Case). As noted by
the federal government in its discussion document, Discussion Document, supra note 16 at 10:
If the precautionary principle were to attain such a status [i.e., a rule of customary international
law], it would automatically become part of Canadian domestic law, unless a contrary domestic
statute exists. To what extent this would signiﬁcantly affect current Canadian law, either as a
substantive and/or an interpretive rule, is unclear and should be considered further.
33
Spraytech, supra note 3 at para. 48.
34
NAFTA, supra note 5 at Article 1139.
35
NAFTA, supra note 5 at Article 1139(g).
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trade in goods and services—principles that were ﬁrst recognized in the
international arena in the GATT36 — and applies them to foreign investment.37 These principles include:
National Treatment: Foreign investors and investments must be treated
no less favourably than domestic ones. Thus both formal and substantive rules cannot be structured to give an advantage to local companies.
Any form of discrimination between domestic and foreign investors is
prohibited unless there is a speciﬁc exemption contained in NAFTA.38
Most Favored Nation Treatment: The best treatment that is given to any
investor from a non-NAFTA country must also be given to all NAFTA country investors.39
Minimum International Standards of Treatment: NAFTA governments
must ensure that basic international rights (e.g., following treaty obligations in good faith and providing due process and equitable treatment)
are afforded to all investors and investments.40
Strict Limitations on Performance Requirements: Performance requirements, which encompass a broad array of possible government regulatory activity designed to beneﬁt a particular area or group (e.g., local
hiring quotas or requiring that ﬁrms use a minimum level of local materials or services) are strictly limited and in many cases prohibited.41
Protection Against Expropriation: Expropriation refers to any act where
a government denies a human or corporate person any beneﬁt of a property holding. NAFTA guarantees that full, swift and fair compensation will

36

Supra note 27.
These principles are primarily articulated in NAFTA, supra note 5 at Articles 1102-1113.
38
NAFTA, supra note 5 at Article 1102.
39
NAFTA, supra note 5 at Article 1103.
40
NAFTA, supra note 5 at Article 1105.
41
NAFTA, supra note 5 at Article 1106.
42
NAFTA, supra note 5 at Article 1110.
37
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be paid to all affected parties after any expropriation occurs.42 Furthermore, NAFTA includes an expansive deﬁnition of “expropriation.”43
In signing on to NAFTA, Canada, the U.S. and Mexico agreed to protect international investments and investors by upholding these principles. Furthermore, under the agreement all these obligations apply to
national governments, sub-national governments (e.g., state, provincial
and local)44 and all government entities. To ensure that these obligations
will be upheld, the three countries also agreed to implement a completely unique investor-state dispute settlement process.
2. Investor-State Dispute Settlement Under Chapter 11
All NAFTA investors are entitled to dispute any “measure” (i.e., “any law,
regulation, procedure, requirement or practice”45) enacted by a foreign
government that is party to the agreement that violates a NAFTA provision. Based upon the particular facts in each dispute, and the wishes of
the aggrieved investor, arbitration panels established under Chapter 11
are governed by the arbitration mechanisms set out by one of the World
Bankʼ’s International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
43

According to its standard legal deﬁnition, “expropriation” is normally limited to the government power of “eminent domain,” namely, “[t]he power of a government entity to convert
privately owned property, especially land, to public use, subject to reasonable compensation for
the taking.” Blackʼ’s Law Dictionary (Pocket Edition), 1996, s.v. “eminent domain.” As a result
of corporate pressure, however, this standard deﬁnition was slowly modiﬁed in the U.S. by a series of decisions handed down by the U.S. Supreme Court. Using the Fifth Amendment (which,
inter alia, protects against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation), the Court has held that “expropriation” also includes “regulatory takings” —which covers
any law, regulation, rule or policy that reduces the commercial value of an investment or the
expected proﬁts from the investment. See M. Dobbin, Brieﬁng Paper, “NAFTAʼ’s Big Brother:
The Free Trade Area of the Americas and the Threat of NAFTA-style ʻ‘Investor-Stateʼ’ Rules”
(2001) at 2. And while “expropriation” is not explicitly deﬁned in NAFTA, Article 1110 refers
to “direct expropriation,” “indirect expropriation” and “measures tantamount to expropriation”
—language which indicates that the wider U.S. conception of “expropriation” has been incorporated into the agreement. This interpretation was conﬁrmed by the B.C.S.C. in the recent appeal
of the Tribunal decision in Mexico v. Metalclad Corp., supra note 7.
44
For a recent discussion of the constitutionality of Chapter 11 panel awards levied against
provinces see M.A. Luz, “NAFTA, Investment and the Constitution of Canada: Will the Watertight Compartments Spring a Leak?” (2000-2001) 32 Ottawa L. Rev. 35. Overall, Luz argues
that a province could be legally compelled under Canadian law to pay an arbitration award if
that province were found responsible for the treaty violation—this despite the fact that the provinces (or other sub-national entities) are not party to NAFTA.
45
NAFTA, supra note 5 at Article 201.
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(ICSID),46 the ICSID Additional Facility47 or the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules.48 Regardless of the arbitration rules employed, however, the process is conducted
under the legal framework set out in NAFTA and tribunals make no reference to the statutory or constitutional laws of the targeted nation.
NAFTA tribunals typically have three trade lawyers appointed as panelists. Normally the aggrieved investor and the foreign government each
nominate a panelist, and then the two appointees jointly select the third
member. All aspects of the subsequent arbitration are kept completely
secret and access to all documents, transcripts and proceedings is strictly
limited to the two disputing parties. Furthermore, governments that are
party to NAFTA but not involved in the dispute do not have the automatic
right to appear before the tribunal. Instead, a government must apply
for intervenor status if it wishes to participate. In general, no one other
than the disputing investor and the NAFTA parties have any right to take
notice of a foreign investor claim, access pleadings or evidence, provide
input, or even observe, the proceedings. Even publication of the ﬁnal
award is not guaranteed. Governments have the discretion to release a
tribunalʼ’s ﬁnal award, but they are not under any obligation to do so.
The only way that concerned citizens or the press can attend tribunal
hearings is if all the parties to the dispute consent—something that has
not yet happened.
Once the tribunal makes a decision it can award monetary damages
to an aggrieved investor. While a Chapter 11 panel cannot strike down
NAFTA-inconsistent measures directly, it can order a country to change
any infringing measure. Finally, there is no appeal procedure for disputing a tribunal award and all awards can be directly enforced through the
domestic courts of all state parties.49
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Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States, 19 March 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, 4 I.L.M. [ICSID Convention].
47
Online: World Bank <http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility/facility.htm> (date accessed 5
November 2002). These rules apply in cases where only one party to the dispute is a signatory
to the ICSID Convention. Mexico is currently not a signatory.
48
UN GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (1976) at 46.
49
See e.g., J.A. VanDuzer, “Investor-State Dispute Settlement Under NAFTA Chapter 11: The
Shape of Things to Come?” (1997) Can. Y.B. Intʼ’l L. 263 at 276-289.
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3. Two Chapter 11 Cases
i. Ethyl Corporation v. Canada
In April 1997 Parliament passed the Manganese-based Fuel Additives
Act50 which imposed a ban on the import and interprovincial transport
of the gasoline additive methylcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl
(MMT) – an additive that had been used in gasoline in Canada since 1977.
MMT is put into gasoline to enhance its octane level, improve fuel combustion and reduce engine “knocking.” The ban was enacted in response
to public health concerns: scientiﬁc evidence suggests that MMT is a neurotoxin that enters the body through the lungs and causes nerve damage
which can lead to psychosis, memory loss and premature death.51 Not
surprisingly, MMT had been banned for use in reformulated gasoline in
the United States and in Europe, and in 1997 Canada was the only country in which MMT was still being used.
In 1997 the only remaining producer of MMT was the Virginia-based
Ethyl Corporation, which exported to its Canadian subsidiary, Ontariobased Ethyl Canada Inc., where MMT was mixed and then sold to Canadian gasoline reﬁners. Six months before the ban was enacted, while
parliamentarians were still debating its merits, Ethyl ﬁled a notice of
intent to submit a claim under Chapter 11 if a ban were imposed. Furthermore, Ethyl claimed that various statements made by the Minister of
the Environment, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister and other
unnamed individuals during the public debate that had taken place over
the safety of MMT had already “created distrust of Ethyl, Ethyl Canada
and the product MMT within the environmental groups and the media
thereby damaging Ethylʼ’s goodwill around the world.”52
50

S.C. 1997, c. 11. The Act was ﬁrst introduced in June 1995, received Royal Assent on April
25, 1997 and came into force on June 24, 1997. See section 21 of the Act.
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See e.g., J. McEachern & C. Shaw, “MMT – NAFTAʼ’s Potentially Lethal Legacy: Lifting of
MMT Ban is Not Justiﬁed by Lack of Scientiﬁc Proof” The CCPA [Canadian Centre for Policy
Alternatives] Monitor (November 1998); Council of Canadians, News Release, “Gasoline Additive and NAFTA Threaten Canadiansʼ’ Health, Scientists and Groups Warn” (4 November
1998).
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Ethyl Corporation v. Government of Canada, (Notice of Intent) at paras. 10, 16, 17, 20 and
21; Ethyl Corporation v. Government of Canada, (Notice of Arbitration) at paras. 59 and 60.
Because of the secrecy surrounding Chapter 11 tribunals these two notices are not publicly
available. However, they are cited in Ethyl Corporation v. Government of Canada, (Statement
of Defence) at 7, online: “NAFTA Cases: Ethyl Corporation,” Appleton & Associates International Lawyers <http://www.appletonlaw.com/4b1ethyl.htm>.
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Five days after the ban was enacted Ethyl ﬁled a claim against the
Canadian government for US$251 million in damages—which was, according to the ICSID, the highest claim for damages ever ﬁled in an investor-state proceeding.53 Ethylʼ’s action marked the ﬁrst time that a NAFTA
investor had used Chapter 11ʼ’s investor-state provisions directly to challenge regulatory action of a foreign government. In its claim Ethyl alleged that the Canadian ban was an illegal restriction on the companyʼ’s
business and expected proﬁts. Speciﬁcally, Ethyl argued that Canada
breached its obligations under three NAFTA provisions: Article 1102 (national treatment), Article 1106 (ban on performance requirements) and
Article 1110 (protection against expropriation).
In July 1998 the Government, worried about the very real possibility
of losing the case and the millions of dollars that could potentially be
awarded by a NAFTA tribunal, settled the dispute with Ethyl out of court.
According to the terms of the settlement, the government revoked the
ban on MMT, paid US$13 million in damages and legal fees, and issued
a statement for later use in Ethyl advertising saying, contrary to scientiﬁc studies and the existence of bans already in place in the U.S. and
Europe, that it lacked any evidence that MMT was dangerous to human
health.
ii. Metalclad Corporation v. Mexico
In 1993 California-based Metalclad Corporation bought an abandoned
hazardous waste disposal site in Guadalcazar, an impoverished and remote area with no developed infrastructure and limited resources in the
Mexican state of San Luis Petosi. The company planned to expand and
re-open the facility and then haul toxic waste and other hazardous materials to the dump—despite the fact that the site had a history of contaminating the local water supply and that more than 20,000 tons of waste
had already been illegally dumped at the site without proper treatment.
After it purchased the facility, however, Metalcladʼ’s plans were
thwarted when the state government informed the company that it could
not expand or re-open the dump without municipal and state approval.
In May 1994, ignoring the state warning, Metalclad began work on the
siteʼ’s expansion. In June and November of 1994 Metalclad ignored of53

Public Citizen Global Trade Watch, Brieﬁng Paper, “Ethyl Corporation vs. Government of
Canada: Now Investors Can Use NAFTA to Challenge Environmental Safeguards” (1997) at 2.
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ﬁcial orders to cease construction. Finally, in January 1997 negotiations
resulted in an agreement that permitted the company to operate a nonhazardous waste disposal facility on the site, but with the stipulation of
ongoing public consultations and negotiations.
Throughout the period of 1993-1997 hundreds of local residents,
still worried about previous water contamination, protested against reopening the facility. In September 1997 an environmental impact assessment revealed that the site was situated atop an ecologically sensitive underground alluvial stream. This conﬁrmed earlier suspicions
that the facility was responsible for the widespread contamination of
the local water supply. In response to this ﬁnding the state declared the
site part of a special 600,000-acre ecological zone—a move that effectively prevented Metalclad from re-opening the dump. As a result, the
company used Chapter 11 to sue the Mexican government for US$ 90
million—a ﬁgure that was more than the combined annual income of
all the residents in the surrounding community. In its claim Metalclad
argued that the actions of the municipal and state governments violated
the companyʼ’s right to future proﬁts on its investment (Article 1110 of
NAFTA) and its right to treatment according to minimum international
standards (Article 1105 of NAFTA).
In August 2000 a NAFTA tribunal awarded US$ 16,685,000 in damages against the national government of Mexico, ruling, inter alia, that (1)
it was improper for the local and state governments to deny Metalclad
a permit to operate the facility based on environmental or public health
considerations, public opposition or the past performance of the facility; and (2) the national government was liable for the damage award. In
so doing, the tribunal ruled that Mexico had unjustiﬁably expropriated
Metalcladʼ’s investment even though construction on the site was never
ﬁnished and the facility itself was never operational.
While there is no appeal procedure provided under Chapter 11, it is
possible, depending upon the location chosen for the arbitration, to apply for limited third party judicial review of international commercial
arbitration awards. Since Vancouver was selected to host the arbitration
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in this instance, Mexico applied to have the tribunalʼ’s decision reviewed
by the British Columbia Supreme Court.54
In May 2001 the Court upheld the tribunalʼ’s award. In his decision,
Tysoe J. commented that the tribunal, in ruling that the Mexican state
of San Luis Petosi expropriated Metalcladʼ’s investment in the facility
when the state created the protected ecological preserve, implied an
“extremely broad deﬁnition of expropriation.”55 However, due to the
very limited scope of the review, Tysoe J. held that the Court had no
authority to overturn the expropriation ﬁnding since it was not “patently
unreasonable.”56

V. NAFTAʼ’S CHAPTER 11 AND THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE
Both the Ethyl and Metalclad cases vividly demonstrate, on a number
of levels, the extent to which Chapter 11 effectively undercuts use of
the precautionary principle as a basis for public policy. In short, the
precautionary principle dictates that when faced with expected serious
or irreversible harm, governments should enact cost-effective measures
to anticipate and/or prevent that harm. In many instances, however, as in
the Ethyl and Metalclad cases, such measures will be deemed an unjustiﬁed expropriation of international investorsʼ’ NAFTA-guaranteed rights to
proﬁt from the use of environmentally harmful products and practices.
Chapter 11 has, in other words, resulted in a massive restriction on
the ability of governments to legislate in ways that protect human health
and ensure environmental vitality and sustainability. Government action that infringes on the rights of private investors to receive returns
on their investment is deemed expropriatory and therefore illegal under
the agreement. Simply put, using the precautionary principle to ensure
a healthy, clean and safe environment does not enable private investors to maximize return on their investments. As a result, such policies
54

See Metalclad, supra note 7; Metalclad supplemental, supra note 7. The Metalclad decision
was the ﬁrst Chapter 11 tribunal decision to ever be subjected to third party judicial review.
Nonetheless, neither Mexico nor Metalclad challenged the jurisdiction of the B.C.S.C to conduct the review. Metalclad, supra note 7 at para 39.
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See supra note 43.
56
Metalclad, supra note 7 at para 100.
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are deemed “trade restrictive” and therefore prohibited. This follows in
perfect conformity to the logic of economic globalization underlying
NAFTA. As University of Manitoba economics professor Robert Chernomas explains:
For the vast majority of ﬁrms not engaged in proﬁt-making from this
sector, health care [or environmental protection] is an input without
any output. It is an expense that does not serve the ʻ‘bottom-line,ʼ’
like adding more steel to the car or workers to the assembly line than
are necessary to produce the standard industry car.57

It is also striking to note that in both the Ethyl and Metalclad cases there
is an underlying presupposition that private corporations and investors
have a pre-existing claim on public property. In the Ethyl case there is
an assumption that Ethyl has property claims over the environment and
the actual physical bodies of people in Canada. It is undisputed that
when MMT is used in gasoline it is emitted into the air and then absorbed
into the bodies of those who come into contact with the emissions, resulting in potentially severe health complications.58 Yet Ethyl was able
to recover damages in the case because the Canadian government recognized that under NAFTA, by virtue of its investment, Ethyl suddenly
had an enforceable property claim over the use and control of both the
environment and the bodily health of the Canadian public.
Similarly, in the Metalclad case the company was assumed, simply
on account of its investment, to have a property claim to the underground alluvial stream, the far-reaching areas that the stream serves and,
again, the physical and environmental health of the people in the local
community. These cases would not have unfolded as they did without
the key assumption that private ownership, by virtue of private investment, extends to things which most people would agree are either inviolable (e.g., their own bodies) or clearly public property (e.g., the environment). Most importantly, the assumption that private investment
can carry with it ownership rights over things such as the environment
57
R. Chernomas, The Social and Economic Causes of Disease (Ottawa: The Canadian Centre
for Policy Alternatives, 1999) at 15-16.
58
See e.g., J. McEachern & C. Shaw, “MMT – NAFTAʼ’s Potentially Lethal Legacy: Lifting of
MMT Ban is Not Justiﬁed by Lack of Scientiﬁc Proof” The CCPA [Canadian Centre for Policy
Alternatives] Monitor (November 1998); Council of Canadians, News Release, “Gasoline Additive and NAFTA Threaten Canadiansʼ’ Health, Scientists and Groups Warn” (4 November
1998).
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necessarily entails that application of the precautionary principle be severely constrained.
Another troubling aspect of these two cases is that NAFTA stipulates
this extraordinary extension of private ownership to foreign investors be
granted cost-free. For example, Metalclad had to make an initial capital investment in the Guadalcazar site as a precondition to launching a
Chapter 11 action. However, once the environmental assessment was
completed and the environmental consequences associated with the site
made clear, there was absolutely no question as to whether Metalclad
retained a claim to the proﬁts it expected from its investment. This was,
in effect, the bottom line of the case: under NAFTA, Metalcladʼ’s claim on
its anticipated proﬁts was in no way affected by the subsequent ﬁnding
that its investment was going to have an enormously negative impact on
the surrounding environment. There was no suggestion that since Metalclad was permitted to enjoy a property entitlement over the disposal
site, alluvial stream, surrounding environment and bodily health of the
local residents, that Metalclad should be forced to pay for this right or
held liable for any health or environmental problems that resulted from
its investment.
Similarly, Ethyl Corporation was allowed to produce and sell MMT,
which is directly damaging to human and environmental health, without
having to contribute towards paying the associated costs. As a foreign
company, Ethyl will not contribute to the tax revenues that undoubtedly
will be required to clean up the environment and address the health
problems caused by MMT. Instead, the Canadian public will pay for all
the resulting damage. Thus, not only does NAFTA afford private investors
a massive cost-free expansion of property entitlements, but the effects
of this recognition are paid for by the same public that is injured. In the
end, all the beneﬁts which result from NAFTAʼ’s Chapter 11 investment
provisions protect and enable private investors to make cost-free returns
on investment, with absolutely no liability attached for any of the ensuing negative consequences for public health or the environment.
Finally, it is important to note that several commentators have predicted that these two cases will have a “chill effect”59 Private investors
and corporations can use Chapter 11 lawsuits, and the threat of such law59

See e.g., T. Clarke & M. Barlow, The Multilateral Agreement on Investment and the Threat to
Canadian Sovereignty (Toronto: Stoddart, 1997) at 42.
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suits, to constrain the policy options of democratically-elected lawmakers. Many governments inevitably will become increasingly unwilling
to enact a wide range of public policies (e.g., measures aimed at protecting human and environmental health on the basis of the precautionary
principle) on account of the potential liability that those policies could
attract under the new rules of international trade law, including NAFTAʼ’s
Chapter 11. This chill effect will constrain government action despite
the fact that affected measures are intended to protect the public interest
or may have been central to the governmentʼ’s electoral success.
The Ethyl case is a quintessential example of the chill effect. Yet in
response to criticism, David Wilson, President of Ethyl Canada, denied
that the chill effect was a problem and stated: “Obviously the government can do what it wants to do, but when something is being taken
away from you, there should be some form of compensation.”60 This
sentiment was echoed in the Metalclad case by Clyde C. Pearce, the
lawyer representing Metalclad: “[T]here is nothing stopping these governments from [enacting a NAFTA-inconsistent public policy] as long as
they pay for it.”61
Despite these reassurances, however, these rejoinders to the threat
posed by the chill effect are misplaced for two reasons. First, as discussed above, they unjustiﬁably presuppose that private investors have
a right to the exclusive, cost-free beneﬁt of public property, and that this
right should be protected at the expense of any others. Second, they fail
to account for the fact that by demanding multi-million (and even billion62) dollar compensation packages, Chapter 11-type claims effectively tie the hands of governments whose budgets cannot accommodate the
possibility of such large damage awards.
It is difﬁcult accurately to assess the extent to which this program
of self-censorship has already befallen NAFTA governments, since draft
legislation can be dropped or amended long before the public takes no60

Appleton & Associates International Lawyers, News Release, “U.S. Company Files Notice to
Seek $200 Million in Claim Against the Government of Canada” (7 October 1996).
61
A. DePalma “Mexico Is Ordered to Pay a U.S. Company $16.7 Million” New York Times, (31
August 2000).
62
California-based Sun Belt Water Inc. has launched an action against the Canadian government
for $14 billion in damages—on the grounds that a British Columbia ban on bulk water exports
constituted illegal expropriation under the terms of NAFTA. See e.g., “Bankrupting Democracy”, supra note 7.

208 – DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

tice. What is clear, though, is that the possibility of this chill effect is
very real. In fact, attorneys representing Ethyl were quite frank about
the precedent the case established for future Chapter 11 actions against
NAFTA governments: “[T]he potential for lawsuits under this process
[i.e., Chapter 11] is far-reaching since it could be used by more than 350
million individuals and corporations throughout the NAFTA countries.”63
As proof of the chill effect international trade obligations are having
on the Canadian government, all proposed legislation and/or regulation
now undergoes routine “trade screening” to ensure compliance with NAFTA and OECD provisions.64 This is clear evidence that international trade
agreements are impacting directly on public policy making. According
to some proponents of globalization, this effect has been embraced and
trumpeted as a good thing—as “the Golden Straightjacket,” according
to New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman.65 Yet from an environmental perspective, such an effect can only be negative. With no meaningful reference or legal recognition in any existing international trade
agreement to the precautionary principle,66 screening draft legislation
for its compliance with international trade obligations can only reduce
the ability of the principle to serve as a basis of environmental policy.
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VI. CONCLUSION
While the Supreme Court of Canadaʼ’s decision in Spraytech does, on
its face, provide support for the precautionary principle and its use in
environmental policy, those who claim that the decision is a turning
point for environmental protection in Canada ignore a critical factor,
namely, Canadaʼ’s international trade commitments under agreements
such as NAFTA. As this paper has illustrated, NAFTA and its Chapter 11
investment provisions effectively undercut the ability of legislators to
utilize the precautionary principle when designing and implementing
environmental policy—a fact that, tragically, can only be a harbinger
of further environmental degradation both within and beyond Canadaʼ’s
borders.

